

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00

INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /083 W

----- 129006

O R 161034Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4044

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5618

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION III: TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE

1. THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITS THE LATEST TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE ON
OPTION III, WITH CHANGES THROUGH THE SPC MEETING OF OCTOBER 13.
IN THIS TEXT, SQUARE BRACKETS ARE REPRESENTED BY PARENTHESES.

2. BEGIN TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE

SPC(OT)N/4(7TH REVISE)

MBFR: DRAFT GUIDANCE ON INTROUDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND
OTHER NEW ELEMENTS INTO THE NEGOTIATIONS

1. IN THEIR OUTLINE OF PROPOSALS PRESENTED ON 22 NOVEMBER,
1973, AND SUBSEQUENTLY, THE ALLIES PROPOSED, INTER ALIAA,
THAT, IN PHASE I THERE SHOULD BE REDUCTIONS OF US AND SOVIET
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FORCES AND A COMMITMENT BY BOTH SIDES AS TO THE GOAL OF THE
NEGOTIATIONS TO BE REACHED IN PHASE II. SPECIFICALLY, THE ALLIES
HAVE PROPOSED THAT:

- BOTH SIDES SHOULD UNDERTAKE A COMMITMENT TO THE

ESTABLISHMENT AS THE GOAL OF THE NEGOTIATIONS OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES IN THE FORM OF A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING, APPROPRIATELY DEFINED IN PHASE I, ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS, TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II. THE ALLIES INDICATED THAT THIS COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 SOLDIERS ON EACH SIDE;

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE UNITED STATES 29,000 SOLDIERS;

- THE SOVIET UNION WOULD WITHDRAW FROM THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS TO THE USSR A TANK ARMY CONSISTING OF 5 DIVISIONS INCLUDING SOME 68,000 SOVIET SOLDIERS AND 1,700 MAIN BATTLE TANKS. THE ALLIES ARE NOW OFFERING THE FOLLOWING ON CONDITION THAT ALL THE FOREGOING GOALS WILL BE AGREED IN PHASE I OF THE NEGOTIATIONS:

- THE UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW AS A ONE-TIME COMPLEMENT TO THE WESTERN REDUCTION CONTRIBUTION A SUBSTANTIAL PORTION OF ITS NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IN CENTRAL EUROPE, NAMELY 1,000 US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, 54 US NUCLEAR-CAPABLE F-4 AIRCRAFT AND 36 US PERSHING BALLISTIC MISSILE LAUNCHERS;

PLUS EITHER

(- THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WOULD BE EXTENDED TO INCLUDE AIR MANPOWER IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS (, RESULTING IN A COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING WHICH MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 900,000 MEN.) (, THE ALLIES PROPOSE THAT THE RESULTING COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 900,000 MEN.))

OR

(- IN ADDITION TO THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER WHICH MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 700,000 MEN, THE ALLIES PROPOSE (, SINCE AN APPROXIMATE PARITY IN AIR FORCE MANPOWER ALREADY EXISTS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES,) TO COMBINE WITH THIS FIGURE THAT OF AIR MANPOWER IN SECRET

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THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS IN SUCH A WAY THAT IT WOULD RESULT IN A COMBINED COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING WHICH MIGHT BE SET AT APPROXIMATELY 900,000 MEN ON EITHER SIDE. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS WILL MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE EAST THAT THIS PROPOSAL DOES NOT ALTER THE POSITION THAT THE ALLIES WILL NOT ACCEPT AGREED REDUCTIONS OF AIR MANPOWER. (AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SOUGHT IN PHASE I ON THE LEVELS AT WHICH THE COLLECTIVE COMMON CEILING TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II WOULD BE SET.))

OR

(- AN AGREEMENT WOULD BE SOUGHT ON THE ORDER OF MAGNITUDE AT WHICH THE COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILING TO BE COMPLETED IN PHASE II WOULD BE SET.)

2. IN PUTTING FORWARD THIS PROPOSAL, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT ALL OTHER ELEMENTS OF THE ALLIED POSITION PREVIOUSLY PUT FORWARD TO THE EAST REMAIN UNCHANGED.

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SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 NSC-05 /083 W

----- 129655

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3. THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD PUT FORWARD ALL THE PROPOSALS IN PARAGRAPH 1 ABOVE SIMULTANEOUSLY (1). THE NUCLEAR ELEMENTS SHOULD NOT BE SEPARATED. IN MAKING THEIR PRESENTATION, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD STRESS THE GREAT IMPORTANCE OF THIS MOVE AND REQUEST THAT THE EASTERN PARTICIPANTS GIVE A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. THEY SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT THESE PROPOSALS ARE BEING PUT FORWARD AS A ONE-TIME OFFER TO OBTAIN EASTERN AGREEMENT TO THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING GOALS. THE ALLIES SHOULD RESTATE THEIR POSITION THAT GROUND FORCES CONSTITUTE THE LARGEST AND MOST SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ELEMENT IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND THAT THE NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON

FOOTNOTE

(1) THE QUESTION OF TIMING WILL BE ADDRESSED SEPARATELY BY THE COUNCIL.

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ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY IN GROUND FORCES MANPOWER AND REDUCING THE DISPARITY IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS BECAUSE THESE EXISTING DISPARITIES ARE THE MAJOR DESTABILISING FACTORS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEY SHOULD EMPHASISE THAT THOUGH THE NEW ALLIED MOVE TAKES INTO ACCOUNT CONCERNS EXPRESSED BY THE EASTERN SIDE ABOUT NUCLEAR AND AIR ELEMENTS, IT CONSTITUTES A UNIQUE OFFER AND IS NOT A STEP TOWARD FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT (IN EITHER PHASE). (THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, IF AND WHEN PRESSED, SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR THAT NO OTHER OFFER FOR THE REDUCTION OF ANY EQUIPMENT OF ANY KIND CAN BE HOPED FOR IN EITHER PHASE I OR PHASE II FROM EITHER THE UNITED STATES OR ANY OTHER WESTERN PARTICIPANT.)

4. IN THEIR INITIAL PRESENTATIONS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD AVOID DISCUSSING THE ISSUES OF ARMAMENTS LIMITATION (1).

5. AS NECESSARY TO MEET EASTERN PRESSURE, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR THAT THEY ARE WILLING TO DISCUSS THE ISSUES OF WHAT ARMAMENTS SHOULD BE LIMITED AND THE NATURE OF SUCH LIMITATION ONLY AFTER THE PRINCIPLES OF THE REDUCTIONS (WHICH GIVE RISE TO LIMITATION) HAVE BEEN THOROUGHLY EXPLORED. (AS REGARDS ELEMENTS OTHER THAN THOSE REDUCED BY THE US AND USSR IN PHASE I, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD MAINTAIN THE POSITION THAT THE LIMITATIONS CONTAINED IN THE WESTERN PROPOSALS REGARDING GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER OFFER IN PRACTICE A SUFFICIENT REASSURANCE AGAINST SIGNIFICANT QUANTITATIVE INCREASES.)

FOOTNOTE

(1) THE HANDLING OF A DISCUSSION WITH THE EAST ON CONSTRAINTS, INCLUDING THE USE OF POINTS IN PARAGRAPHS 6-10 BELOW, WILL BE ADDRESSED IN A SEPARATE PAPER ON NEGOTIATING STRATEGY.)

6. SUBSEQUENTLY IF THE EASTERN NEGOTIATORS, HAVING PROVIDED AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE, PRESS FOR DETAILS AND IF, IN THE JUDGEMENT OF THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS, THE RESPONSE SHOWS SERIOUS EASTERN INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE BASIC ELEMENTS AS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1, THE FOLLOWING MAY

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BE OUTLINED IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS CONCERNING LIMITATIONS:

- THE US NUCLEAR REDUCTIONS WOULD RESULT IN LIMITATIONS ON US NUCLEAR WARHEADS, US SURFACE-TO-SURFACE MISSILE LAUNCHERS FOR BALLISTIC MISSILES OF OVER 500 KILOMETER RANGE, AND US AIRCRAFT OF NUCLEAR-CAPABLE MODELS;

- THE NUMBER OF EACH OF THESE US ELEMENTS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS COULD NOT EXCEED THE NUMBER IN THE ARE FOLLOWING PHASE I REDUCTIONS, WITH SUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO PERMIT NORMAL TRAINING AND EXERCISES;
- THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT INCREASE THEIR NUCLEAR ELEMENTS ANALOGOUS TO THOSE (US) NUCLEAR ELEMENTS (WITHDRAWN BY THE US) (WHICH ARE LIMITED AS DESCRIBED ABOVE) (, IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT).

7. AS PART OF THE DISCUSSION OF ARMAMENT LIMITATIONS, ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ALSO MAKE CLEAR THAT THE NUMBER OF SOVIET MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE LIMITED TO THE NUMBER REMAINING AFTER PHASE I REDUCTIONS.

8. IF THE EAST ASKS IF LIMITS WOULD BE IMPOSED ON US TANKS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT SOME CONSTRAINT ON THE LEVEL OF US MAIN BATTLE TANKS (- IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT US TANKS WOULD NOT BE INCREASED IN SUCH A MANNER AS TO UNDERMINE THE BASIS OF THE AGREEMENT-) COULD BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST AS PART OF A SATISFACTORY PHASE I AGREEMENT.

9. IF THE EAST SEEKS STILL FURTHER DETAILS, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER, AS APPROPRIATE, THAT, CLEARLY, FURTHER DETAILS WOULD NEED TO BE AGREED; E.G., ON WHICH US AIRCRAFT MODELS AND SOVIET TANK MODELS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO THE LIMIT; ON THE FORM OF THE RECIPROCAL PROVISION AFFECTING SOVIET NUCLEAR ELEMENTS, ON EXCEPTIONS FOR TRAINING AND EXERCISES, ETC.

10. IF, AT ANY POINT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AFTER THE POINTS IN PARAGRAPH 5 ABOVE HAVE BEEN MADE,) THE EAST ASKS FOR LIMITATIONS ON ALLIED NON-US EQUIPMENTS, WHETHER GROUND, AIR OR NUCLEAR, THE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS SHOULD ANSWER THAT
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SUCH LIMITATIONS ARE NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE WEST(: (THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENTS OFFERED BY THE ALLIES ON GROUND AND AIR MANPOWER OFFER ADEQUATE ASSURANCE THAT THE OBLIGATIONS FOR US AND SOVIET REDUCTIONS IN THE PHASE I AGREEMENT WOULD NOT BE CIRCUMVENTED) (THE ONLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATIONS ON NON- US ALLIES WOULD BE THOSE RESULTING IN PRACTICE FROM COLLECTIVE LIMITS ON ALLIED AIR AND GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA)).

END TEXT DRAFT GUIDANCE
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 18 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: n/a
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 OCT 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: greeneet
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975NATO05618
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: 11652 GDS
Errors: n/a
Film Number: n/a
From: NATO
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197510101/abbrzmny.tel
Line Count: 268
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE
Office: n/a
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: greeneet
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 10 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <10 APR 2003 by SmithRJ>; APPROVED <17 SEP 2003 by greeneet>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: MBFR: OPTION III: TEXT OF DRAFT GUIDANCE
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR
To: STATE
SECDEF INFO MBFR VIENNA
BONN
LONDON
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006